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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
This is an appeal from a final order of the Eighth
Circuit Court of Utah County, State of Utah, denying Defendant's Motion to set aside the Default Judgment taken in the
subject case and is taken pursuant to Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals, Title II, Rule 3(a), U.C.A.
STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The nature of the proceedings herein are an appeal by
the Defendant-Appellant from a final order entered by the
Eighth Circuit Court, Utah County, State of Utah, Judge
Joseph Dimick denying Defendant's motion pursuant to Rule
60(b) for an order setting aside the Default Judgment taken
by Plaintiff against Defendant.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
The determinative rule is Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, stated verbatum as follows on page iv.

iii
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HBLIEF PROM JUDGMENT Oil ORDER
(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or
other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or
omission may he corrected by the court at any time of its own initialive
or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court
orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may -he so
corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may he so corrected with leave of the
appellate court,
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered
Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
roiiri may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b) ;
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse p a r t y ; (4) when, for
any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally served upon
1 he defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed
to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment
has been satisiied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application;
or (7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than three months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This Rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain
an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as
prescribed in these Rules or by an independent action.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Plaintiff/Respondent (hereafter "Timpanogos") submits
that the only issue presented on appeal is whether the trial
court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to
set aside the default judgment entered herein.

Defendant-

Appellant (hereafter "McDonald") has stated that an additional issue should be considered that Timpanogos is not the true
party in interest and would receive unjust enrichment on the
apparent belief that Timpanogos would receive double payment,
having been reimbursed by the subrogee insurer, Utah Farm
Bureau Insurance Company.

Timpanogos submits that this is

not an issue.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Defendant, Dennis McDonald dba Mac Builders was

personally served with a Summons and Complaint in this matter
on September 19, 1987.

(Addenda attached hereto, P. 1, 2,

3)2.

The Defendant did not respond to said Summons and

Complaint and a Judgment was taken on or about October 27,
1987, thirty eight (38) days after personal service was
effected.

(Addenda attached to Appellant's brief, third and

fourth page).
3.

After said Judgment had already been taken the

Defendant called Plaintiff's counsel concerning the Judgment
and at that time stated that he was aware that he had been
served but had forgotten about the matter because he was busy
1
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with other business matters,

(Affidavit of Taylor D. Carr,

attached to Appellants brief addendum, Pages 16 through 19).
4.

McDonald claims in his Affidavit that he called

Timpanogos attorney before the twenty (20) day period was up,
however, Timpanogos attorney denies this (Affidavit of Taylor
D. Carr, Appellant's addendum, supra).
5.

Nowhere in McDonald's Affidavit does McDonald state

that he was told at any time that he did not have to file an
answer to the Complaint herein.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There is no showing that the lower court abused its
discretion in refusing to set aside the Default Judgment.
Defendant sets forth a lengthy statement of his meritorious
defense, but has failed to show the threshold requirements
for setting aside a default pursuant to Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P.
as set forth in State by and through D. of S. S. vs. Musselman, 667 P. 2d 1059 (Utah 1983).
McDonald further claims that Timpanogos is not the true
party in interest and would receive double recovery if
awarded this judgment, however, this claim is unmeritorious
because this is a subrogation action on behalf of Utah Farm
Bureau.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
McDonald asserts that he should be given relief from the
Default Judgment entered against him pursuant to Rule 60(b),
U.R.C.P., however, McDonald does not make it clear which
section of that rule should apply.

It appears from

McDonald's Affidavit that he would rely on Rule 60(b)(1)
which concerns excusable neglect, mistake, inadvertance or
surprise.

McDonald also sets out a lengthy statement of what

his defense would be.

It is clear that McDonald must show

the elements of excusable neglect (or any other reason
specified in Rule 60(b)) before the Court can consider his
contention that he has a meritorious defense.
through D. of S. S. vs. Musselman, supra.

State, by and

The lower court

failed to find the necessary elements pursuant to Rule 60(b)
and denied McDonald's motion to set aside the default.

The

lower court is given a broad latitude of discretion in ruling
on such motions and this court should not reverse the lower
court's decision unless an abuse of discretion can be shown.
Mayhew vs. Standard Gilsonite Co. 376 P. 2d 951 (Utah 1962) ;
Board of Education of Granite School District vs. Cox, 384 P.
2d 806, (Utah 1963), stating that a "patent abuse" of
discretion must be shown.

The lower court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Defendant's motion to set aside the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Default Judgment.

What appears to be one of the most recent

Utah cases discussing all of the issues presented here is
Musselman, supra.

In that case the Utah Supreme Court made

it clear that a Defendant under these circumstances must
first show cause why the Default Judgment should be set aside
before he can show that he has a meritorious defense.

In the

Musselman case the lower court did find sufficient cause
under Rule 60(b) to set aside the judgment but went on to
rule that the Defendant had not shown a meritorious defense.
The Supreme Court in discussing the case, however, discussed
both requirements in setting aside a default judgment and
made it clear that the threshold issue of excusable neglect
must be shown before the Court will consider whether the
Defendant has a meritorious defense.

The court in this

connection stated that while they are in accord generally
with the doctrine that the courts should be liberal in
granting relief against default judgments, they also acknowledge the existence of the broad latitude of discretion
which is accorded the trial court on ruling on such motions
citing Mayhew vs. Standard Gilsonite, supra.

The court

further in quoting from Air Chem Intermountain Inc. vs.
Parker 513 P. 2d 429 (Utah 1973) stated as follows:
The trial court is endowed with considerable
latitude of discretion in granting or denying a motion
to relieve a party from a final judgment under Rule
60(b)(1), U.R.C.P., and this court will reverse the
trial court only where an abuse of this discretion is
clearly established .... the rule that the courts will
incline towards granting relief to a party, who has not
had the opportunity to present his case, is ordinarily
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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applied at the trial court level, and this court will
not reverse the determination of the trial court merely
because the motion could have been granted. For this
court to overturn the discretion of the lower court in
refusing to vacate a valid judgment, the requirement of
public policy demand more than a mere statement that a
person did not have his day in court when full
opportunity for a fair hearing was afforded him or
his legal representative. 667 P. 2d at 1055. (Emphasis
added).
In applying this rule of law to the case at hand, one
must read through McDonald's Affidavit on file to determine
which statements in the Affidavit apply to his assertion that
he is entitled to the first element required to set aside a
default under Rule 60(b).

He Must show therein the elements

of excusable neglect or any other reason set forth in Rule
60(b).

It appears that there are three statements set forth

in McDonald's Affidavit which would apply to this issue.
They are as follows:
1.

After being personally served with the Summons and

Complaint in this matter McDonald called Timpanogos7 attorney
during the twenty (20) day period to find out what the action
was about.

(Although Timpanogos7 attorney denies that this

call ever took place).
2.

After the judgment was entered against him, McDonald

called Timpanogos7 attorney again and discussed the case;
3.

That McDonald is not trained in the law nor has he

been involved in litigation and is not schooled in the Rules
of Civil Procedure and was unaware of the requirements with
respect to filing an answer to complaints.
It is interesting to note that although McDonald claims
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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he had two conversations with Timpanogos' attorney, not once
does he state that he was told he did not have to file an
answer to the Summons and Complaint which was served upon
him.

The Summons and Return of Service are attached hereto

as Addendum 1 and 2, showing that McDonald was personally
served and that the Summons clearly states that he must file
an answer in writing within twenty (20) days of the date of
service.

Default was not taken until thirty eight (38) days

after service of process and although Timpanogos' attorney
denies that he ever had any conversation with McDonald prior
to the time of the default, even taking McDonald's assertions
at face value, he has not set forth sufficient cause under
the case law to show that the lower court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the Default.

For example in

Musselman the defendant was hospitalized or convalescing
during a three week period after he was served.

The only

evidence in this case for McDonald's excuse is that he is not
schooled in the law and did not think he had to file an
answer after calling Timpanogos' attorney.

(Timpanogos'

attorney states in his Affidavit that what McDonald really
said was that after he was served he became so busy he forgot
about the matter).
In Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P. 2d 741 (Utah
1953), the fact situation is somewhat similar to the case at
hand, although the defendant in Warren had even a stronger
argument.

In Warren the defendant stated that after the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated ?•OCR, may6contain errors.

default was taken plaintiff's attorney made an oral promise
that the defendant could have more time to answer.

Further-

more, Dixon claimed to have been ill at the time of service,
and finally, the defendant stockholders claimed that they
received no notice of the action in time to defend their
interests.

The court found that such was not sufficient ex-

cusable neglect so as to allow the vacation of the default
judgment, stating that "... the movant must show that he has
used due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing
by circumstances over which he had no control". 260 P. 2d at
743.

(Emphasis added).

Also in Warren the Supreme Court

stated that illness alone is not sufficient to make neglect
in defending one's action excusable.
With respect to. McDonald's claim that he is not schooled
in the law, and thus should be relieved from the judgment, we
find the case of Board of Education of Granite School
District, supra, where the defendant's excuse for setting
aside the default was that he thought the summons was invalid
and, therefore, paid no attention to it.

The court refused

to set aside the default based upon that excuse.
ARGUMENT
POINT II
THIS IS A SUBROGATION ACTION AND MAY BE BROUGHT
IN THE NAME OF THE SUBROGOR. THERE WILL BE NO
^, (, UNJUST ENRICHMENT.
McDonald states that if he were required to pay this
judgment that Timpanogos would be unjustly enriched by
receiving double payment.

This argument needs little
7
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discussion because it is clear that this is a subrogation
action which has been brought in Timpanogos' name by the
subrogree, Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co.

The two letters from

Utah Farm Bureau to McDonald which are attached as addendum
to his brief make this clear.

The right, in fact the

requirement, under the strict rule of common law of the
subrogee to bring an action in the name of the subrogor is
almost universal.

73 Am Jur 2d Subrogation, Section 137.

In

the event of recovery such would go to the subrogee insurance
carrier who stands in the shoes of the subrogor after payment
is made and, therefore, there would be no double recovery by
Timpanogos as asserted by McDonald.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the case law cited herein as well as the
facts of this case, there has been no showing that the lower
court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the
default judgment.

Furthermore, there is no showing that

Plaintiff would be unjustly enriched.

Therefore, Plaintiff

respectfully requests that the lower court ruling be affirmed.
DATED and SIGNED this 17th day of June, 1988.

TAYLOR DPARR
i

TAYLOR D. CARR
Attorney for DefendantRespondent
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the
above and foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, postage prepaid, this
17th day of June, 1988, to:
Gary H. Weight, Esq.
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin
43 East 2 00 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, Utah 84603-0200

c ~TAYLORD7

&M^

Attorney/for/ DefendantRespondent

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

ADDENDUM

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
10may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

•

*"•

(

I

» rt

(

t ^ M C E SERVED^

J:\Hr,

DATE & TIMB'
TAYLOR

D.

U

^

/
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CAPACITY ccPMcn A , f/^

CARR

Attorney for Plaintiff
350 South 400 East, Suite 114
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-0888

P R O C E S S SFRVPn

>'((•* •'

./(-'

' " ' ' • if'<•

UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT
TIMPANOGAS VILLAGE,
Plaintiff,
SUMMONS
vs.

YOU ARE

HEREBY SUMMONED

in writing to the

Civil No.

?73d0^gvCA/

and required to file an Answer

attached Complaint

with the

Clerk of the

above entitled Court and to serve upon or mail to Plaintiff's
attorney, Taylor D. Carr, 350 South 400 Eastf Suite 114f Salt
Lake City,
(20) days
fail to

Utah

84111f a copy of said Answer within twenty

after service

of this

Summons upon

you.

If you

do so, Judgment by default will be taken against you

for the relief demanded in
filed with

the Clerk

said

Complaint,

which

has been

of the above entitled Court and a copy

of which is hereto annexed and herewith served upon you.
DATED this

\&\

day of September,

TAYI^R D. CARR
Attorney for Plaintiff
SERVE:

Dennis McDonald
627 West 1700 North
Orem, Utah 84057
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH

DENNIS McDONALD dba MAC BUILDERS!
Defendant•

!

>: -,

'A

AFFIDAVIT OF PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
8

COUNTY OF
I

)

^^221&.

SS
w
— - jjju^^
A ) e^vru^

LJ^fZ.

^ - fJ<

W^/JryrljJ
/// " A•' 01-*-<zs- * ^

? being

first

duly sworn

or\

oath derioses and says:
I am a citizen of the United States over the age of £1 years
at the time of service herein,
in

and not a party to or

interested

the within action and that I received the within and

hereto

annexed.

jUd^ZWQ^^
on t h e

l^day

^'Jj^rVr^^

ft)\

delivering

of

mZfiJXMtJuiJiA^^ « 198^,

._T^ Cr^YL^^Jrz
to

and l e a v i n g

A_ J r £ Z ? ^ f ^ ^ _
a

suitable

the,
a true

and s e r v e d t h e same upon,

w i t h i n named d e f e n d a n t ,

cooy o f

the

by

said__^^^^^^^^_

w i t h_J&3241d*. MtJlzilJLd.-----

person over the age of 14 years,

at

the

following

<2^^jj£yL-.

address, _ _ ^ _ 7 _ _ ^ ^ _ / _ 7 f _ l „ ^ l | ?

I further certify that on the document/s served,

•

I endorsed

the date, olace of service, and added my name and official title,
if any, thereto at the time of such service.
Dated this_^J£day o f _ , ^ ^ ^ ^ r 2 ^ ± ^

Subscribed and sworn before me thisjz?£day

? 19&7

of£

My commission expires:

M-UZ&Service
Milage
Other

Total

+-.L/-3-JL
*_^_il<:5'_
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TAYLOR D. CARR
Attorney for Plaintiff
350 South 400 East, Suite 114
Salt Lake City, Utah R4111
Telephone: (801) 363-0888
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT
TIMPANOGAS VILLAGE,

|

Plaintiff,

1
(

COMPLAINT

1

VS.

DENNIS McDONALD dba MAC BUILDERS
Defendant.
Plaintiff

'

Civil No.

i
above

named

complains

of defendant and for

cause of action alleges:
1.
and the

The amount in controvery
damage complained

is

less

than $10,000.00

of occurred in Utah County, State

of Utah,
2.

Prior to the 9th

caused to

be installed

day of

in or

February, 1986, Defendant

near the attic of plaintiff's

commercial building located at 560 South State, Orem, Utah, a
certain copper water line.
3.

Defendant in

performing the duties of installation

of said water line, did so
manner such

that on

in a

negligent and unworkmanlike

or about the 9th day of February, 1986,

said water line froze and burst causing damage to Plaintiff's
building.
4.

As a

direct and

proximate result of the aforesaid

1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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negligent, careless and unworkmanlike conduct on

the part of

Defendant, Plaintiff was damaged in the sum of $4,029.46.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff

demands judgment against Defendant

in the sum of $4,029.46 together
and such

with costs

incurred herein

other and further relief as the Court deems just in

the premises.

DATED t h i s

\\

day of September, 1 9 0 ^ /

I

^^V^M^AYLpi^f). CARR
Attorney for Plaintiff

2
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